October 7: Israel's Security Catastrophe

How warnings were ignored, the military was overwhelmed, and Netanyahu blocks accountability

December 2025 | Based on Israeli Investigations

Overview: Israel's Worst Security Failure

On October 7, 2023, approximately 5,600 Hamas-led militants breached Israel's Gaza border, killing around 1,200 people and taking over 250 hostages. Israeli investigations have since revealed a catastrophic series of failures: intelligence warnings were ignored, the military was overwhelmed for hours, and political leadership failed in its most basic duty to protect citizens.

Dead

~1,200

Hostages Taken

250+

IDF Troops at Border

767

Attackers

5,600
Key Finding: "Complete Failure"

In February 2025, the IDF released its official investigation, acknowledging "complete failure" to prevent the attack. The report stated the military "failed in its mission to protect Israeli civilians."

Sources: Al Jazeera | Times of Israel | NPR

Intelligence Warnings Dismissed

Multiple investigations have revealed that Israeli intelligence had detailed warnings about the attack—some describing the exact plan Hamas would execute—but these were systematically dismissed by leadership.

The "Jericho Wall" Document

Hamas Attack Blueprint Obtained—and Ignored

According to The New York Times and Times of Israel, Israeli intelligence obtained a 40-page document detailing virtually the exact attack plan Hamas would execute—more than a year before October 7.

  • The document described an initial rocket barrage
  • Efforts to knock out surveillance systems
  • Waves of gunmen crossing by land and air
  • The document circulated among military and intelligence leaders

Warnings to Netanyahu

The Military Intelligence Directorate issued no fewer than four separate warnings to Netanyahu between March and July 2023.

Shin Bet Chief's Warning: "War is Coming"

In July 2023, Shin Bet head Ronen Bar explicitly warned Netanyahu that "war is coming," based on his assessment that the "axis of resistance" perceived Israel as weaker due to internal rifts over Netanyahu's judicial reforms.

Netanyahu rejected these warnings both in private and public. In an April 2023 interview, when asked directly about security warnings, Netanyahu responded by saying they were "exaggerated."

Junior Analysts Ignored

In July 2023, a member of the Israeli signals intelligence unit alerted her superiors that Hamas was conducting attack preparations, stating:

"I utterly refute that the scenario is imaginary."
— Israeli Intelligence Analyst, July 2023

An Israeli colonel ignored her concerns. Multiple junior analysts and border sentries raised alarms on numerous occasions. Their warnings were systematically ignored.

Final Hours: Five Warning Signs Missed

The IDF identified five signs of unusual Hamas activity the night before the attack but determined they did not indicate an imminent threat.

Netanyahu's Office: Alert Not Passed On

Netanyahu's office admitted that the PM's intelligence officer received an IDF memo detailing suspicious Hamas activity three hours before the attack—and didn't pass it on to Netanyahu. The office argued this was justified given the document's "non-urgent framing."

Sources: Times of Israel - Alert Not Passed | Times of Israel - Five Warning Signs | War on the Rocks | NPR - Shin Bet

Military Response: Hours of Chaos

Israeli investigations revealed that the military response was catastrophically delayed, leaving communities and civilians to defend themselves for hours against overwhelming forces.

Gaza Division Defeated

Division Defeated For

~10hrs

IDF Troops

767

Hamas Fighters

5,600
IDF Investigation Finding

For nearly 10 hours, the IDF's Gaza Division—responsible for the border with the Strip—was "defeated and overrun." Military planners were unaware of this while coordinating their response.

The IDF had just 767 soldiers deployed to the border that morning. They faced 5,600 fighters crossing in three waves, backed by ~4,000 rockets and 57 drones.

Timeline of Failures

6:29 AM
Hamas begins rocket barrage and ground assault
7:00 AM
IDF Chief holds first assessment—30 minutes after attack began
7:00 - 8:00 AM
34 areas under attack; IDF present in only 11 of them
9:45 AM
IDF Chief meets with Netanyahu—over 3 hours after attack started
~12:00 PM
Reinforcements begin arriving; Gaza Division starts operating again
4:00 PM
IDF finally reaches all attack sites—nearly 10 hours later

Kibbutz Be'eri: A Case Study

7 Hours Defended by Civilians

Kibbutz Be'eri was primarily defended by its lightly-armed civilian volunteer security team from 6:30 AM until roughly 1:30 PM—seven hours.

  • ~340 Hamas fighters infiltrated the kibbutz
  • Not until afternoon did enough IDF reinforcements arrive
  • A full-scale operation to retake Be'eri didn't begin until nearly 6:00 PM
  • Over 100 people were killed; 30+ taken hostage

The military's chief spokesperson stated: "The army failed in its mission to protect the residents of Kibbutz Be'eri."

Nova Festival: Left Alone

According to Haaretz, the Nova festival wasn't mentioned in any situation assessments during the night, despite the IDF and Shin Bet picking up suspicious signs. The attack lasted uninterrupted for over two hours. 378 people were killed and 44 taken hostage.

Sources: Times of Israel - Gaza Division | Times of Israel - IDF Chief Schedule | FDD - Be'eri

The Hannibal Directive Controversy

A July 2024 Haaretz investigation revealed that the IDF invoked the controversial "Hannibal Directive" during October 7—a protocol that prioritizes preventing soldiers from being captured, even at the cost of their lives.

What is the Hannibal Directive?

The Hannibal Directive was a controversial IDF operational order directing the use of force to prevent soldiers from being taken captive—even if it meant risking their lives. It was officially cancelled in 2016 by then-IDF Chief Gadi Eisenkot, who called it outdated.

Yet on October 7, the protocol was invoked at multiple locations.

Where It Was Used

According to Haaretz, the directive was employed at three army facilities:

  • Erez (Beit Hanoun) Crossing - At 7:18 AM, divisional HQ issued "Hannibal at Erez"
  • Re'im Army Base
  • Nahal Oz Outpost

Friendly Fire Deaths

Israelis Killed by Israeli Forces

On December 18, 2023, the IDF confirmed that Israeli combatants "fell as a result of friendly fire on October 7." The military added it would not be "morally sound" to investigate these incidents further.

Documented cases include:

  • Efrat Katz, 68 - Likely killed by Israeli helicopter fire during an attempted Hamas kidnapping at Kibbutz Nir Oz
  • Kibbutz Be'eri tank incident - An Israeli tank fired two shells at a house known to hold over a dozen hostages, including 12-year-old twins. Only two hostages survived.

UN Findings

UN Commission Report (June 2024)

A UN Commission found that Israeli forces used the Hannibal Directive in several instances on October 7. The report stated that in two instances, Israeli forces "had likely applied the Hannibal Directive," resulting in the killing of up to 14 Israeli civilians.

Expert Condemnation

"There is absolutely nothing [in the IDF Code of Conduct] to allow someone to kill an Israeli citizen, in uniform or not."
— Asa Kasher, Author of IDF Code of Conduct, to Haaretz

Sources: Haaretz Investigation | Times of Israel | Al Jazeera

Netanyahu's Years of Hamas Support

Israeli investigations and historians have documented how Netanyahu's governments spent years strengthening Hamas—policies critics say contributed directly to October 7.

The Qatari Money Pipeline

$30 Million Monthly in Cash

According to Israeli historian Adam Raz and multiple Israeli media reports, Netanyahu's governments routinely approved and encouraged the transfer of Qatari funds into Gaza to prop up Hamas.

  • Qatar began transferring money to Hamas in 2012
  • In 2018, Netanyahu persuaded his cabinet to approve bigger transfers via cash
  • From 2018 until October 2023, a car carrying suitcases with ~$30 million in cash passed through Rafah Crossing every month
  • Most of the security establishment was reportedly against this policy

The "Conception"

Israel's strategic approach became known as the "conception"—keeping Hamas in power while limiting its military capabilities. According to 972 Magazine and Haaretz:

Strategic Goal: Divide Palestinians

The policy aimed to keep the Palestinians divided—Hamas controlling Gaza, the PA controlling parts of the West Bank—thereby preventing unified Palestinian statehood demands.

As historian Adam Raz argues: "Netanyahu was trying to strengthen the interest Hamas represents—weakening support for a two-state solution and keeping Israel in a state of endless war."

Civil Commission Finding

The November 2024 civil commission led by retired judge Varda Alsheik found that Netanyahu bore responsibility for:

  • Ignoring "repeated warnings" ahead of October 7
  • His "appeasing approach toward Hamas over the years"
  • "Undermining all decision-making centers, including the cabinet and the National Security Council"
  • Continuing to "work to strengthen Hamas by transferring funds"
"Arrogance and inherent blindness also led the political leadership to continue to work to strengthen Hamas by transferring funds and avoiding an offensive initiative in the face of threats."
— Civil Commission Report, November 2024

Sources: 972 Magazine | Haaretz | Times of Israel - Civil Probe

Accountability: Who Resigned, Who Refused

Military Leaders Who Took Responsibility

Resignations and Dismissals
  • Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliva (Military Intelligence) - First senior official to resign: "The Intelligence Directorate under my command did not fulfill its mission"
  • Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi (IDF Chief of Staff) - Resigned January 2025, citing "recognition of my responsibility"
  • Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman (Southern Command) - Resigned, later formally dismissed
  • Multiple intelligence, operations, and air force commanders censured or dismissed

Netanyahu: No Responsibility

Blocking State Inquiry

Throughout the war, Netanyahu has refused to take any responsibility for October 7, saying he will answer questions only after the war ends.

  • Refused to testify before the civilian commission
  • His cabinet rejected a state commission of inquiry
  • Approved only a "watered-down government committee" where Netanyahu oversees the inquiry makeup
  • Accused potential court-led investigations of being "predetermined" and biased
  • Called investigation efforts part of the "deep state"

November 2025: External Panel Verdict

An external panel of former senior military officers determined that most of the IDF's top-tier investigations into its failures were inadequate, and some were unacceptable.

"Most of the factors explaining the failure span several years and multiple systems, which indicates a longstanding systemic and organizational failure."
— External Panel Report, November 2025

IDF Chief Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir stated that while the military accepts full responsibility, an "external" commission of inquiry must be established to reach full conclusions—something the government has resisted for over two years.

Sources: Ynet - Accountability | PBS | NBC News | Times of Israel - External Panel

The Bottom Line

Israeli investigations have documented systematic failures at every level: intelligence warnings dismissed, a military overwhelmed for hours, controversial protocols that killed Israeli civilians, and years of policies that strengthened Hamas.

Military and intelligence chiefs have resigned or been dismissed. Netanyahu has refused all responsibility and continues to block a state commission of inquiry—two years after Israel's worst security disaster in history.

The civil commission concluded the October 7 catastrophe "was not an act of fate but could have been dramatically minimized."